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A description of any social institution such as the state will
be shaped (and limited) by the conceptual apparatus chosen by
the investigator. This is an obvious point; different priorities and
methodologies will highlight different features and generate
different explanations. Where some features are illuminated,
others are correspondingly left in shadow. When it comes to
describing the state, we would expect a political scientist to ask
different questions and work with different concepts than, say, a
sociologist. And a lawyer? Academic lawyers who examine the
state have often focused on what Nick Barber calls legalistic
accounts: they examine rules, and the commands that the rules
instantiate, and the nature of the authority by which the
commands are made. These legalistic accounts of the state
include the enduring contributions of Hans Kelsen and Max
Weber, as well as the strain of Oxford analytical legal philosophy
exemplified by the work of H. L. A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and
Leslie Green. These studies attend closely to the vertical
relationship between the state and its members (typically, its
citizens) constituted by legal rules. In setting out his own account
of the state—an account that is self-consciously more
interdisciplinary in method—Barber acknowledges these
intellectual debts and identifies several points of disagreement
(and agreement) with them, but his focus is predominately on
those features of the state that have been left neglected or
under-explained in these more legalistic accounts.
1. Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford University.
2. 2012–13 Ann and Herbert W. Vaughan Visiting Fellow, James Madison Program in
American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University; Associate Professor, Faculty of
Law, University of Western Ontario.
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Barber’s proposal is to consider the state as a social group
and, specifically, a group that uses rules (legal and nonlegal) to
relate members not only—or even predominantly—to the
governing institutions, but to each other. This approach to the
state necessitates first coming to terms with the nature of social
groups generally and how the state qualifies as a social group
(chapter 2), the forms of membership in that social group
(chapter 3), and the rules that bind the members to the state and
to each other (chapters 4–6). With the main concepts thus
articulated, Barber carries on in chapters 7–10 to test drive his
model. Is it intelligible, he asks, to attribute intentions and
actions to the state (chapter 7)? If it is, to what extent (and in
what sense) can states be responsible for their actions? To what
extent do current members of the state share that responsibility,
and what should be required of them as a consequence? Does it
lessen responsibility if the actions in question took place several
lifetimes ago (chapter 8)? In the book’s final grouping of
chapters (9–10), Barber addresses the claims of legal and
constitutional pluralism, particularly in the context of the
European Union.
All of this is preceded by an opening chapter that addresses
methodology in constitutional theory—a free-standing essay that
ought to be required reading for any serious student of
constitutional theory. Barber surveys rival approaches to
constitutional theory, including historical, critical, interpretive,
and political. Although he argues for the priority of interpretive
theory (in the sense that other approaches presuppose an
interpretive account) (pp. 2–5), he nevertheless insists that other
approaches to constitutional theory are “all . . . valuable, all . . .
compatible, and all play a part in our understanding of the
nature and functioning of constitutions” (pp. 1–2). In keeping
with Weber, Hart, and John Finnis, Barber works from the
postulate that it is the task of the constitutional theorist to
identify the “central case” of the constitutional institution under
investigation (p. 8). Identifying the central case cannot be a
merely descriptive enterprise, because it requires the theorist to
evaluate the criteria by which centrality will be assessed. It is
inescapable that theorists begin with some “ethical framework
which gives content to the good and the bad, and then use this to
identify features of importance” (p. 10). From this, Barber
proposes that “a good account of a constitutional institution will
identify those features which enable it to advance, or to threaten,
the well-being of people” (p. 11).
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The state, then, must be evaluated (as must its
constitutional institutions) and Barber follows Aristotle in
selecting the well-being of the state’s members as the central
criterion for evaluation (p. 12). Unavoidably, a theorist’s account
will be shaped by what Barber labels one’s “ethical beliefs,”
generated from one’s understanding of “human flourishing” (p.
11). For Barber, this is “an unhappy consequence” because, he
explains, the attractiveness of the theorist’s account of the state
will depend on “the attractions of the rival political ideologies
that lie behind them” (p. 11). But what, a reader might well ask,
is the reason for this regret? Is it a function of a relativistic metaethics? Does it flow from a belief that well-being is the product
of whatever ideologies to which one happens to be attached?
But despite a few lines in which Barber suggests that one’s conclusions about what constitutes well-being will be the products of
3
pre-existing social commitments, such a reading should be
resisted on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with
Barber’s overall methodology. And like Hart (and notwithstanding Hart’s characterization of his own work as an in part an
4
exercise in descriptive sociology), Barber never backs away
from judging some practices as choice-worthy and denouncing
others as “entirely bad” (p. 13). Instead, Barber’s misgiving is
better read as stemming from the concern that disagreement
about what constitutes human well-being (whatever the truth of
the matter is) will be an unavoidable barrier to agreement about
what constitutes a good account of the state.
The decision not to pursue a more comprehensive account
of human well-being (or even take sides in any debate about the
nature of well-being) is regrettable but defensible; the
methodological injunction to use well-being as a criterion for
understanding the state can be compatible with many
conceptions of well-being, and the theorist who is articulating a
methodology can be content to observe that his methodology is
5
compatible with all (or many) of them. But even though it is
defensible for Barber to remain largely aloof from questions
about the nature of well-being, one can wish that he had said
something more about the state’s jurisdiction to advance well3. E.g., “a theorist’s account will be conditioned by her ethical beliefs,” such as the
ethical beliefs of individualists, communitarians, nationalists, and libertarians, and these
“different political ideologies will generate different accounts of social phenomena” (p.
11).
4. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW vii (Oxford 1961).
5. Once again, there are echoes of Hart’s methodology in articulating of a general
theory of law that was to be independent of conceptions of human flourishing.
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being. Here again, there is a constellation of possibilities: can the
state prohibit conduct that harms the well-being of the actor, or
just the well-being of third parties? Is the state authorized to
promote every aspect of a person’s or group’s well-being, or just
some subset related to interpersonal life? Or does well-being
instead require that persons be allowed maximum autonomy to
define and follow their own conception of well-being? Once
again, these questions are off-menu. But one should be reluctant
to quibble about what is left out when so much else is on offer.
Throughout, The Constitutional State identifies more areas of
fruitful inquiry (drawing on the resources of many disciplines
including political philosophy, action theory, psychology, and
neuropsychology) than it can fully pursue. The book’s breadth
and interdisciplinarity leads to many unexpected discoveries, but
the result is sometimes (as in this instance) like settling in to a
conversation with a learned friend, wrestling together with
questions that provide both new insight and further questions
and then—too soon—it’s time to go.
At the heart of The Constitutional State is a trio of chapters
devoted to understanding legal and nonlegal rules: how they
constitute social groups, how they provide reasons for action,
how they contribute to a legal order. Although these chapters
are part of a progression of thought intended to illuminate our
understanding of the state, they serve equally as free-standing
essays in jurisprudence and constitutional theory. Chapter 4, on
“The Constitution of Social Groups,” clearly locates Barber
within the Oxford tradition of analytical legal philosophy. But
although Barber is fully conversant in the paradigms of rules
explored by Hart, Raz, Finnis, and others, he is not writing a
mere history of ideas; he clears away debris where conflict is
more apparent than real, and picks up the fruitful strands of
thought that were left neglected by others. The premise of
chapter 4 is that “[a]ll social groups are constituted by rules” (p.
67). At a minimum, even for the simplest of social groups, there
must be shared rules setting “the objective the group is aiming to
achieve,” the membership of the group, who is to be bound by
the rules of the group, and how the group will make decisions (p.
67). These rules can be as simple and open-ended as a resolution
of a group of friends “to meet up with the intention of
undertaking an activity together, without any clear idea of what
that activity will consist” (p. 67). For such a group, the
constitutive rule identifies (1) the reason that the group has for

!!!MILLER-282-CITIZENFOCUSEDACCOUNTREVIEWOFBARBER.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/21/2012 1:32 PM

2012]

BOOK REVIEWS

297

being a group (e.g., to pursue a good such as friendship), as well
as (2) a means chosen to participate in that good (p. 67).
Although simple social groups can be constituted by rules
that remain largely unconscious, large and complicated groups,
like states, need formal institutions for making decisions and
resolving disputes (pp. 72–73). Barber usefully distinguishes
between those internal rules that a group sets for itself and those
external rules that are set by others outside of the group. In an
interesting discussion, Barber points to the possibility of conflict
between internal and external rules, and observes that when
conflict occurs, it is not obvious as to which will prevail, which
will become the “real” rule. In an example drawn from the law
of charities, Barber demonstrates that a charity that finds that its
chosen purpose violates an external rule (such as some rule of
charity law) has several options: it can change its purpose to
bring it to conformity with the law, or it can pretend to conform
to the external rule while secretly leaving its conduct unchanged,
or it can openly defy the external rule (pp. 70–72). The
opportunity for conflict between internal and external rules is
magnified in the case of the state, and Barber specifically applies
his account of rules to the complex case of the state in chapter 5
(and further develops it in his discussion of constitutional
pluralism and the case of the European Union in chapters 9 and
10).
Constitutions, Barber tells us, can contain both legal and
non-legal rules, and can include laws drawn from other legal
systems. So despite Kelsen’s historical (and contemporary)
influence over much British constitutional scholarship (p. 77),
Barber argues that Kelsen’s account of the state is “incompatible
with a central strength of [British constitutional] scholarship: the
recognition of the plurality of sources of the constitutions” (p.
78). Within this plurality of sources, Barber would include, for
example, international law, regardless of whether it has been
incorporated within the domestic system by a rule of domestic
law. His reasoning is that, to the extent that such an
unincorporated rule is followed by state officers and institutions
and treated by them as binding, it forms part of the constitution
(p. 80). Broadly ecumenical, Barber would include constitutional
principles in the constitution, rejecting a sharp divide between
constitutional rules and principles. Principles, such as those
based in references to “dignity” or “equality” in constitutional
preambles, may be understood as generalized rules that may or
may not be legally enforceable, but nevertheless may have
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directive force for state officers and institutions (pp. 86–87).
Similarly, Barber rejects a sharp distinction between constitutional laws and conventions, arguing that conventions and
laws are two types of social rule that share many common
qualities and functions, and that the differences between them
are matters of degree. Conventions can be converted into laws
by both legislatures and courts (p. 103).
Having explored the nature of the rules that bind citizens to
the state and to each other, Barber turns in chapters 7 and 8 to a
novel exploration of the moral character and responsibility of
the state. The argument ranges freely through psychology and
philosophy (culminating in the half-apologetic “[w]e have
strayed a long way from constitutional theory” (p. 118)) in the
service of an intensely practical set of questions: Is it meaningful
to conclude that a state is responsible for it actions? What is the
rationale for holding it responsible? What are the state
obligations that flow from this responsibility? And can citizens—
as members of the state—be rightly held responsible for state
actions that they not only did not participate in, but disavowed?
What obligations for redress fall on citizens? It is important to
understand in what sense the state possesses intentions and
undertakes actions in order to understand: (1) what it has done,
(2) what it is responsible for, and (3) what character it possesses.
The implication for the citizen is again mediated through the
concept of well-being: Being a member of a morally deficient
state makes one’s life less of a success than it otherwise would be
(p. 104).
“States form intentions and undertake actions. They have
successes and failures, embarking on commendable projects and
vicious schemes” (p. 124). It is important to get clear on the
concept of responsibility for state action (both at the level of the
state and the level of the citizen), because it bears on what
remedial action may be required of both the state and the
citizen. Barber catalogues the various categories of responsibility
(including causal, moral, legal, role, and remedial (pp. 124–30))
and discusses different respects in which a state or person can be
judged to be responsible for an action or occurrence. Determinations of responsibility are particularly tricky when there is a
6. There is also an extensive literature on the question of what functions
constitutional principles ought to have in constitutional litigation. See, for example,
chapters by T. R. S. Allan, Mark Walters, and Jeffrey Goldsworthy in EXPOUNDING THE
CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Grant Huscroft ed., Cambridge,
2008).
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break in the constitutional continuity of a state. To what extent
(and in what sense) is the contemporary South African state
responsible for the misdeeds of Apartheid South Africa? A
critical concept highlighted by Barber is remedial responsibility.
While the new state may in no way be morally responsible for
the actions carried out by its predecessor, it may nevertheless
bear a remedial responsibility for cleaning up the mess left
behind. The question is important because, as Barber notes,
“[d]iscussion of responsibility often rapidly shades into
discussion of how we should react to a finding of responsibility;
when blame or punishment is an appropriate reaction to a
person’s conduct” (p. 127).
This distinction between moral responsibility and remedial
responsibility leads Barber to conclude that to the extent that
contemporary Britons, for example, benefit from wrongs that
may have been done by their colonizing ancestors, they may
(while not attracting any blame for any wrongs committed by the
state in carrying out imperialist policies) nevertheless have a
remedial responsibility to others for the benefits that they have
retained and currently enjoy (p. 128).
The discussion of the citizen’s responsibility leads to some
surprising conclusions. Members of the state, Barber argues, are
not simply responsible for those actions which they are
personally implicated in. They are also responsible—in some
sense—“for actions they oppose or are neutral towards” (p. 134).
This is because a citizen has the capacity to participate in the
state’s decision-making, and therefore bears some responsibility
for failing to stop measures that the citizen judges to be
wrongful. This surprising conclusion is generated from the judgment that “[i]t is better to have been a citizen who opposed a
bad policy, and failed, than to have been a citizen who defended
this measure—but it is far better still to have succeeded in
stopping your state embarking on a misguided action” (p. 134).
Barber is willing to follow the logic of the argument to its
unappealing terminus: That state members who are themselves
victims of state wrongs (e.g., are members of a persecuted
minority) are partly responsible for their own mistreatment.
Barber fully acknowledges that to attribute responsibility in such
a scenario “might appear unduly onerous” (p. 134).
Nevertheless, he insists, such a concern would “rest on a
misunderstanding of the implications of responsibility for those
individuals” (p. 134). Membership would be, he says, “a form of
tragedy” (p. 134). Doubtless it would be tragic, but on any
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conception of responsibility surveyed by Barber, the ascription
of responsibility in these circumstances seems bizarre.
In chapters 9 and 10, Barber shifts his focus to the legal
order and challenges what has become a growth industry in legal
scholarship—legal pluralism. Barber focuses on two strands of
legal pluralism: (1) the co-existence of legal and non-legal rules,
and (2) contradiction between rules (pp. 146–48). A pluralist
model for a legal order requires both multiple sources of law and
the possibility of inconsistency between legal rules. Notwithstanding much scholarship to the contrary, Barber argues that it
is in fact difficult to find examples of the legal contradictions that
are needed to make legal pluralism an interesting phenomenon
(pp. 147–48). The Rhodesian crisis is explored as one example,
and the European Union as the other. Barber concludes that
having multiple sources of legal rules (such as EU and domestic
legal systems) that create the possibility of inconsistency is not
something to be necessarily feared. Constitutional dilemmas can
remain unresolved “provided that each side exercises restraint”
(p. 170). Inconsistent claims to authority can co-exist, and not
undermine a stable framework for governing, provided that each
side refrains from pressing their competing supremacy claims in
the absence of actual conflict. The risks of actual conflict—of
ultimately destabilizing the legal order—“provide incentives on
each party to strive towards harmonious interpretations of the
law” (p. 171).
Constitutional pluralism is addressed as a distinct form of
legal pluralism in chapter 10, one which is concerned with the
overlap of states rather than legal systems. Barber works up to
the ultimate question in the application of his conception of the
state: Is the EU a state? It clearly possesses a territory, a
membership, and a set of institutions. But the question is to be
answered in terms of the relationship between these institutions
and its members (p. 175). Indeed, the EU claims authority over
its members, and expresses that authority directly through law. It
claims primacy over contrary provisions of national law, its court
claims supremacy over the interpretation of its law as well as the
authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and it characterizes
its members as citizens (p. 176). Although the authority claims of
the EU may suggest that it understands itself to be a state, it is
unclear that the people of Europe—the people whom the EU
claims as citizens—accept the EU as a state. Barber endorses the
argument that EU will only have become a state “when the
people of Europe obey the commands of the Union because the
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Union wills it, and not because of their allegiance to their
national constitutional order” (p. 181). But Barber leaves open
the possibility that the relationship between the EU and the
people of Europe could change and make the authority claims of
the EU more plausible. Were that to occur, it would generate
genuine constitutional pluralism, where the authority claims of
the EU and the member states would be in conflict.
The Constitutional State is unfailingly intelligent and
provocative, and should be welcomed by students of constitutional theory, constitutional law, political science, and legal
philosophy.

